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CRYSTALLIZED REGULARITIES1 
Verónica Gómez Sánchez 
 
The nomic structure of our world spans many levels of description. The explanatory and predictive 
success of the ‘special sciences’ – biology, psychology, geology, and so on – reveals the existence of 
robust regularities (sometimes called ‘special science laws’) that knit non-fundamental phenomena into 
intelligible levels of description. There are two conceptions of how these robust regularities fit into the 
physical world. On a foundationalist conception, the physical laws (or physical properties) are the 
source of all other nomic facts, including the robustness of these macro-regularities. On an egalitarian 
conception, the physical laws are no more fundamental than the laws describing the behavior of genes, 
ecosystems, or societies.2  
Egalitarians and foundationalists agree that generalizations about nonfundamental reality can 
differ in nomic status:  Mendel’s laws of genetics and the laws of thermodynamics have an ‘elite’ status, 
which is not shared by merely true generalizations such as ‘All the coins in my pocket are silver’. But 
they disagree about how this elite status relates to physics.  While egalitarians give a single account of 
eliteness, which applies both to physical and higher-level generalizations, the foundationalist's account 
of eliteness divides into two (roughly independent) parts. The first part is understanding what, if 
anything, generates the fundamental laws of physics. (Here the term ‘fundamental law’ refers to those 
regularities whose lawful status doesn’t derive from more basic lawhood facts – even if their being 
 
1 This paper has benefitted from discussions with many people, including David Albert, Laura Callahan, Sam Carter, 
Ruth Chang, Eddy Chen, Barry Loewer, Jill North, Jonathan Schaffer, Isaac Wilhelm, and Tyler Wilson. I’m especially 
grateful to Ezra Rubenstein, Ted Sider and an anonymous referee at this journal for extensive feedback on earlier 
drafts.    
2 Egalitarianism is not a very unified position. Fodor is egalitarian in holding that special science laws have their own 
metaphysical ‘oomph’, which they do not inherit from the physical laws. See J. A. Fodor, "Special Sciences (or: The 
Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)," Synthese XXVIII, 2 (October 1974): 97–115. Conversely, Nancy 
Cartwright, Craig Callender, and Jonathan Cohen arrive at an egalitarian conception by downgrading the metaphysical 
status of physical laws. For them, all lawful generalizations earn their nomic status in the same way: by capturing 
patterns that our experience of the world presents us with, in a vocabulary that is useful for us. See Nancy 
Cartwright, The Dappled World: Essays on the Perimeter of Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Craig 
Callender and Jonathan Cohen. "Special Sciences, Conspiracy and the Better Best System Account of Lawhood," 
Erkenntnis, LXXIII, 3 (November 2010): 427–47; and Jonathan Cohen and Craig Callender, "A Better Best System 
Account of Lawhood," Philosophical Studies, CXLV, 1 (July 2009): 1–34. 
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laws is not fundamental).3 The second part is understanding how those fundamental physical laws 
generate nomic facts spanning all levels of reality.  
This paper aims to advance the second part of the foundationalist project. I develop and 
defend a reductive account of ‘robust generalizations’ or ‘special science laws’ which vindicates various 
aspects of scientific practice that may initially seem in tension with foundationalism. This account 
accommodates physically contingent, non-strict robust generalizations that have privileged 
formulations in non-fundamental vocabularies. The basic idea is that robust generalizations  earn their 
elite status by featuring in the ‘ideal scientific summary’ of the nearby physical possibilities.  
 
I. PRELIMINARIES 
 
I.1. The theoretical role of robustness. When we’re justified in attributing robustness to a generalization, 
we’re thereby entitled to rely on it in characteristic ways when engaged in predicting, reasoning 
hypothetically, and explaining. Before putting forward a metaphysical account of robustness, it helps 
to rehearse these conceptual connections. This will help clarify the target concept, as well as its 
significance to our theorizing.  
Consider firstly the connection between robustness and prediction. Encountering various 
black ravens warrants the conclusion that the next encountered raven will be black. But observing that 
some of the coins in someone’s pocket are silver doesn’t similarly justify the expectation that 
unobserved coins in her pocket are also silver. This intuitive asymmetry plausibly results from the fact 
that the generalization ‘All ravens are black’ seems like a good candidate for a robust regularity, while 
the generalization ‘All coins in my pocket right now are silver’ doesn’t.  
Secondly, robust generalizations support counterfactuals/hypotheticals. If you take ‘All ravens 
are black’ to be robust, you probably also endorse (and should endorse) a set of associated 
counterfactuals: ‘If a raven had been born a minute ago, it would have been black’, ‘If I were to fill 
this room with ravens, they would all be black’, and so on. In evaluating such conditionals, you consider 
alternative ways things might have been while holding fixed the raven-black connection. Contrast this 
to an accidental generalization such as: ‘All the people in this room are tall’. I might believe this to be 
 
3 I’ll be neutral on whether fundamental laws are metaphysically primitive, summaries of the world’s actual history, 
or generalizations that flow from the essences of properties.    
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true, but I do not endorse counterfactuals such as: ‘If Anne were in this room, she would be tall’, ‘If 
someone were to enter this room, they would be tall’, and so on.4 
Thirdly, robustness connects to explanation. This connection has two aspects. On the one 
hand, robust generalizations explain their instances. ‘All ravens are black’ explains why the particular 
ravens I happened to see today were black, whereas ‘Everyone in this room is tall’ doesn’t explain why 
Anne, who happens to be in this room, is tall. On the other hand, robust generalizations are capable 
of backing explanations of one particular state of affairs in terms of another. Why am I sleepy? Because 
I skipped my morning coffee. Here, the generalization ‘Coffee-drinkers who are caffeine-deprived get 
sleepy’ serves as a linking principle between two properties – sleepiness and caffeine-deprivation – licensing 
an explanation of an instance of the first in terms of an instance of the second. Only robust 
generalizations link properties in this way. I cannot explain why Anne is tall by citing the fact that she 
entered the room a minute ago. In a nutshell: explanations trace patterns of dependence that are 
underwritten by robust regularities. (The robustness of the generalization does not, however, suffice 
for the success of an explanation: not any sound argument containing a robust generalization as a 
premise is explanatory.)5  
Because of these connections to predictions, hypotheticals, and explanations, robust 
regularities may deserve to be called ‘laws’. I prefer to use a different term, to avoid connotations that 
the term ‘law’ has acquired. We should not assume at the outset that robust regularities are physically 
necessity, perfectly accurate, unrestricted in scope, and so on. Moreover, I want to leave open the 
possibility that robust regularities are importantly different from physical laws, even if they play some 
of the same roles. 
 
I.2. Robustness vs. Physical Necessity.  Providing a foundationalist account of robustness may initially seem 
like an easy task. The foundationalist can recognize a basic nomic distinction among macro-regularities: 
some are physically necessary (they are necessitated by the physical laws), and some are physically 
 
4 As Michael Strevens points out in "Physically contingent laws and counterfactual support," Philosopher’s Imprint, VIII, 
8 (August 2008): 1–20, contingent generalizations like ‘All ravens are black’ are not held fixed under all counterfactual 
suppositions. I follow Strevens in thinking that counterfactual support is a matter of degree: robust regularities have 
a much higher degree of counterfactual support than accidental generalizations. (I discuss this further in § 4.2).   
5 The claim that only robust regularities back explanation is compatible with causal/difference-making accounts of 
explanation that attribute a central role to causal generalizations. We can think of causal generalizations as constituting 
a special sub-class of the robust regularities, whose membership conditions are to be specified by a theory of 
causation/causal explanation. 
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contingent (they fail to hold in some physically possible scenarios). But more careful reflection reveals 
that the notion of physical necessity does not coincide with the notion of robustness that I seek to 
understand. Many physical necessities are not regarded as robust from the perspective of the higher-
level sciences, and some physically contingent regularities are so regarded.  
Grant, for argument’s sake, that ‘All emeralds are green’ is a physically necessary robust 
generalization. The truth of this statement metaphysically entails the truth of ‘All emeralds are green-
or-blue’, so the latter will be physically necessary as well. However, the generalization involving the 
disjunctive property green-or-blue does not thereby acquire the elite explanatory status that the former 
statement has. This suggests that the class of robust regularities is not closed under metaphysical 
necessitation: a statement’s robustness is not automatically transmitted to the statements that it 
necessitates. 
For familiar reasons, we cannot deal with this by associating robustness with a particular 
syntactic form. Compare ‘All emeralds are green’ and ‘All gremeralds are grue’ (where x is a gremerald 
if and only if it is an emerald and observed before 3000, or a sapphire and not observed before 3000). 
The two generalizations are syntactically alike, and have the same modal strength. Nonetheless, they 
clearly differ in explanatory power. 
Note that this issue cannot be solved by imposing a general ban on gerrymandered properties. 
Take ‘Consuming caffeine helps people stay awake’.  While this statement is plausibly robust, it entails 
non-robust generalizations that involve no disjunctive or gerrymandered predicates. Consider a variant 
of an example due to Henry Kyburg6: let an object be ‘hexed’ if and only if some hexing gestures are 
performed over it. ‘Consuming caffeine helps people stay awake’ metaphysically necessitates 
‘Consuming caffeinated beverages which have been hexed helps people stay awake’. But the latter 
generalization does not inherit the explanatory status of the original one. If I’m trying to explain why 
I’m more likely to be up late when I drink coffee in the evening, the right regularity to cite is the one 
about caffeine, not the one about hexed caffeinated beverages. 
One could insist that the above differences are not differences in nomic status, and argue on 
this basis that explaining them is not a task for a theory of robustness. One can pass the task over to 
the theory of explanation, which could then pass it along to the pragmatics department. It should be 
apparent, however, that other things being (roughly) equal, we should prefer a theory of robustness 
which helps us capture the above differences in explanatory power. Thus, I’ll be reserving the term 
 
6 Philip Kitcher, "Explanatory Unification," Philosophy of Science, XLVIII, 4 (December 1981): 507–31.  
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‘robustness’ for a class of explanatorily elite statements, which is not closed under metaphysical 
necessitation. It will not follow from the claim that ‘Fs are Gs’ is robust that ‘Fs are Gs-or-Hs’ is 
robust, even if the former necessitates the latter.  
I have presented reasons to think that physical necessity does not suffice for robustness. There 
are also reasons to doubt that physical necessity is necessary for robustness. There is a growing 
consensus that many physically contingent generalizations are capable of playing the roles associated 
with robustness.7  
This ‘contingency hypothesis’ has been most influential in the philosophy of biology, after 
John Beatty persuasively argued that no known biological generalizations are physically necessary.8 The 
key premise in Beatty’s argument is that all biological generalizations have been found to have 
exceptions. Take Mendel’s law of segregation: ‘In diploid organisms, the probability that each allele at 
a genetic locus is transmitted to a child is 50%’. A few species have been found to have genes that do 
not segregate in a 50:50 fashion, but exhibit a bias in favor of one of the alleles. Or consider 
generalizations about genetic coding, which specify pairings between nucleic acids and amino acids. 
These generalizations, once thought universal, turn out to have exceptions in certain eukaryotes.  
Exceptions are significant because they reveal the dependence of biological generalizations on 
conditions that look contingent from the perspective of physics. For instance, exceptions to 
generalizations about the genetic code make salient alternative ways this code could have been set up. 
Investigating these alternatives led Francis Crick to formulate the ‘frozen accident’ hypothesis: the idea 
that the genetic code is chemically arbitrary, but stable once established.9 
It may be true nonetheless that the above generalizations can be associated with physically 
necessary conditionals of the form: under conditions C, G (where C describes some background 
conditions that – together with the physical laws – entail the generalization G). But this alone cannot 
be what distinguishes them from accidental regularities. Take a true sentence of the form ‘In year x, it 
rained every other Tuesday’. If the laws are deterministic, there is some contingent condition C such 
 
7  See Gerhard Schurz, “What Is Normal? An Evolution-Theoretic Foundation for Normic Laws and Their Relation 
to Statistical Normality,” Philosophy of Science, LXVIII, 4 (December 2001): 476–497; Sandra D. Mitchell, "Ceteris Paribus 
– An Inadequate Representation For Biological Contingency," Erkenntnis, LVII (November 2002): 329–50; and 
Michael Strevens, "Physically contingent laws and counterfactual support, " Philosopher’s Imprint, VIII, 8 (August 2008): 
1–20. 
8 John Beatty, "The Evolutionary Contingency Thesis," in Gereon Wolters and James G. Lennox, eds., Concepts, 
Theories, and Rationality in the Biological Sciences (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), pp. 45–81. 
9 Francis Crick, “The Origin of the Genetic Code,” Journal of Molecular Biology, XXXVIII, 3 (December 1968): 367–379. 
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that ‘if C, then in year x it rained every other Tuesday’ is physically necessary. Yet this doesn’t show 
that the pattern of rain in year x was non-accidental. We need a principled distinction between 
physically necessary conditionals with robust consequents, and ones with accidental consequents.  
We have seen that physical necessity is neither necessary nor sufficient for robustness. If 
robustness is inherited by the macro from the micro, the inheritance principle is not as simple as: ‘All 
and only physical necessities are robust’. We need to find inheritance principles which ensure that 
nomic force i) reaches only those generalizations with the right structure and level of generality, and 
ii) can reach physically contingent generalizations. If no such principles could be given, egalitarianism 
would gain a lot of plausibility. But if we can provide such principles, there is no pressure to think that 
higher-level nomic structure is metaphysically autonomous.  
 
II. CRYSTALLIZATION 
 
The modal structure that our physical theories posit outstrips the notion of ‘physical necessity’. 
Physical theories come equipped with state-spaces, which tell us not only which configurations of the 
fundamental physical stuff are possible, but also which states are similar or ‘nearby’. If we take the 
current physical state of our world and change the location of three fundamental particles by 1nm in 
random directions, we get a state that is physically nearby. If, instead, we move around all of the 
particles that make up New York City, we will get a state that is further away.  
In what follows, I will develop the idea that our scientific efforts are primarily aimed the 
discovery of patterns that hold across our ‘modal neighborhood’: a class of possible worlds that are 
‘similar’ to ours (where world similarity is defined in terms of distance in a physical state-space).  
A generalization’s holding at all nearby worlds cannot, however, suffice to make it robust. The 
property of holding at nearby worlds behaves like a necessity modal (with a more restrictive accessibly 
relation than physical necessity). But robustness cannot be equated with any necessity modal, since it 
is not preserved under entailment.  
Taking inspiration from Lewis’s influential account of laws10, I suggest that what makes some 
regularities stand out as scientifically elite is their ability to efficiently summarize our modal 
neighborhood. I call such regularities ‘crystallized’. Crystallized regularities are the axioms of the best 
 
10 David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Malden: Blackwell, 1973). 
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system for our modal neighborhood, where this system spans all levels of description. The rest of this 
section develops and refines this definition of crystallization, by defining the notions ‘modal 
neighborhood’ and ‘best system’ in foundationalist-friendly terms.  
 
II.1 Modal Neighborhoods. Imagine possibility-space laid out around you. You are standing at the actual 
world, whose current state is s. Assuming physicalism, s can be exhaustively characterized in terms of 
the fundamental properties of the most basic physical objects (particles/space-time points), and the 
fundamental relations they bear to each other. To simplify the exposition, let us pretend that we are 
living in a classical world. Then, an exhaustive description of the current physical state consists of a 
specification of the position and momenta of each fundamental particle. The space of all possible 
states so described is known as ‘phase space’.  
From the perspective of a given point in phase space (in this case, the point corresponding to 
state s), we can ask which possible states are nearby. Then a state sʹ is near our state s if almost all the 
particles have similar positions and velocities in sʹ as they do in s. Given a state-description for s (that 
is, a specification of positions and momenta for each particle), we can create descriptions for nearby 
states by minimally modifying s – for example, by changing the location of a few hundred particles by 
a couple of meters,  giving some particles a small velocity boost… We can measure the distance of 
these modified states from the actual state s by appeal to a metric on the state-space: in this case, a 
Euclidean metric on phase space is the natural choice.11 
Once we have a notion of nearness for pairs of physical states, we can define nearness for 
worlds (which correspond to trajectories through state-space): Two worlds w and v are near at time t 
if (i) they have the same laws, and (ii) their states at t are near each other. If you collect all the worlds 
that are (or will be) near ours at some time in your lifetime, you get your ‘modal neighborhood’.  
 
11 Although phase space does not have intrinsic metric structure –there is no built-in definition of ‘distance’ between 
points – its structure does favor some ways of measuring similarity over others. For instance, it would be natural to 
pick a metric that obeyed the following constraints: two states that differ only in the position of one particle (by 1cm) 
are more similar to each other than two states that differ in the position of more particles (each by 1cm); if two states 
differ only in the position of a single particle, their degree of similarity should be inversely proportional to the distance 
between the particle’s respective positions.  
Various choices of units for the different physical quantities (position and momentum in our case) yield different 
Euclidean metrics. The incommensurability of these different quantities needn’t be a problem; the account succeeds 
as long as all reasonably natural metrics make similar predictions. 
 8 
To appreciate why the idea of a ‘modal neighborhood’ might be of interest, take the robust 
regularity ‘All ravens are black’. Suppose we have granted that this regularity is physically contingent: 
non-black ravens populate many physically possible worlds. They can be found not only in exotic/very 
distant physically possible worlds, but also in worlds very much like ours at some point in history. 
Rewind to a time long before common ravens existed, when the first RNA populations were ready to 
undergo Darwinian evolution. Minor alterations to the state of the world back then would likely lead 
to dramatic differences in the course of evolutionary history. Worlds that were ‘nearby’ back then may 
now contain populations of brown ravens. Thus, the ravenhood-blackness connection was once 
fragile.  
Fast-forward to the present moment. Take the world’s complete state at some time in our 
epoch: the current time, yesterday, tomorrow, or a year from now. Consider minor alterations to that 
state: give a few particles a velocity boost, cut the wings off a mosquito in your office, delete a word 
in this paper. Each one of those ‘physically small’ alterations determines a physically similar possible 
state of the world. Evolve each of those states by the physical laws, in both temporal directions. 
(Assume for now that the laws are deterministic, so each state determines a single world). The minor 
alterations you made at the chosen time result in divergences from the actual world, both in the future 
and the past. In the nearby worlds with the wingless mosquito, you will not be bitten 20 times. So, you 
will finish your work earlier, you will arrive home earlier… and so on.  
Will these differences affect the color of ravens? Probably not.12 Even if you were to fiddle 
with a few raven eggs, you will not easily re-direct the evolutionary path of the species. In general, 
small physical changes will not affect the color of ravens, perhaps with the exception of very special 
targeted manipulations of many raven reproductive cells. ‘Ravens are black’ was once fragile, but it has 
become crystallized.  
This suggests that epochs differ with respect to their crystallized regularities. This should not 
come as a surprise. I have granted already that some crystallized generalizations depend on contingent 
background conditions. In the case of ravens, for instance, their color depends on conditions in the 
distant past (before raven evolution had taken its course), but also on conditions of the current 
environment: for example, the absence of established human practices of bleaching ravens. We do not 
normally expect these background conditions to change in the near future. But, given their 
 
12 Some readers may worry that evolving nearby states towards the past with the dynamical laws will often yield anti-
entropic world histories. I address this concern at the end of this section.   
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contingency, they may well change some day. And if this contingency doesn’t threaten the explanations 
and inferences we base on the generalization, the fact that it will one day cease to hold should not 
either.  
Similar reasoning suggests that different spatial regions may support different robust 
regularities at a given time. Suppose you were to learn about a human population that traveled from 
Earth to another planet long ago, and has been established there ever since. Their visual and auditory 
systems may have subtly changed in response to their new environment, meaning that our best 
psychological theories do not describe them accurately. Arguably, this should not make any more of a 
difference to our Earth-bound psychological theorizing than what happens in other physically possible 
worlds.13  
To allow for crystallization to vary across epochs and locations, I will relativize the notion of 
a modal neighborhood to a spatio-temporal region R. Suppose, for instance, that our region of interest 
is that occupied by Earth from 1000 to 3000. The modal neighborhood of R at our home world w is 
a set of physically possible ways R could have been which are nearby from the perspective of w.  I’ll 
use world-region pairs <R, v> to represent ways region R might have been (the way R is at world v is 
a way R could have been at the home world w). More precisely: 
 
MODAL NEIGHBORHOOD 
The modal neighborhood of <R, w> is the set of all pairs <R, v> such that:  
1) v and w have sufficiently similar (complete) states at some time in R, and 
2) v obeys w’s laws.14  
 
 
13 Someone might deny that this faraway civilization is human. However, there is surely some natural kind that 
encompasses both civilizations (plausibly, the biological notion ‘human species’). Let ‘pan-human’ pick out that 
broader kind. In the imagined scenario, we would still like to predict and explain seemingly non-accidental patterns 
concerning the broader kind (for example, ‘All pan-humans studied by X’s lab in 2020 perceived stimulus S as a rigid 
object’). Now, if all robust psychological generalizations are about the narrow kind human, then explanations and 
predictions of such regularities (concerning pan-humans) would have to rely on a generalization linking humans and 
pan-humans (for instance, ‘All members of the human species in earth are humans’). Thus, not all region-relativity 
would be eliminated. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.) 
14 This definition assumes primitive trans-world identity for spatio-temporal regions, as well as a privileged 
simultaneity structure. These assumptions simplify the presentation, but are not essential to the account. The 
definition could be rephrased in terms of Cauchy surfaces and counterpart relations on space-time regions. 
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For example, take <Earth-today, actual world> as our domain of interest. The following recipe yields 
worlds in its neighborhood. Pick any time t in the relevant epoch: in this case, any time today. Identify 
the state of the world at t – call it s. Make a physically small change to s within the relevant spatial 
region; for instance, make the velocity of a bird in Antarctica slightly slower. This change takes us to 
a nearby state sʹ. The physically possible world(s) whose state at t is sʹ will be one of many worlds in 
the modal neighborhood of <Earth-today, actual world>. Note that this world must differ from actuality 
at times before and after t. Shortly before t, the mental state of the bird would have been different. 
Shortly after t, the mental state of anything perceiving the bird would register a different velocity. And 
so on…15  
We can repeat this procedure for any time t today; any world we reach is in the modal 
neighborhood. Thus, the modal neighborhood of <Earth-today, actual-world> contains a continuous 
infinity of richly varying worlds. But, by construction, these worlds have at least two things in common: 
1) they obey the actual laws of physics, and 2) they closely resemble the actual world at some time 
today (but different worlds resemble the actual world at different times). To be crystallized relative to 
Earth-today, a generalization G ought to hold locally at enough of these neighboring worlds. 
Before moving on to discuss best systems, I have like to draw attention to an important issue 
concerning time’s arrow. The crystallization account will need to be paired with some solution to the 
problem of time’s arrow, which has been widely discussed in the foundations of statistical mechanics. 
The problem is this: many of the nearby trajectories which are compatible with the dynamical laws 
have very strange pasts. If we take arbitrary nearby states, and evolve backwards with the dynamical 
laws, we will end up with lots of world-histories that exhibit a strange entropy gradient: entropy 
increases towards the past as well as the future. This means that, in many of these worlds, we find all 
sorts of thermodynamic processes happening ‘in reverse’: ice unmelting, coffee spontaneously getting 
warm…  
 
15 This recipe for identifying a worlds’ neighbors (with respect to region R) is closely related to Tim Maudlin’s recipe 
for evaluating counterfactuals, in The Metaphysics within Physics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). According to 
Maudlin, to evaluate ‘P at t > Q’ we start with a description of the world at t, modify it in accordance with an 
instruction encoded in the antecedent of the counterfactual (make it such that P at t while changing as little as 
possible), and let the laws ‘generate’ a physical model (a world) by taking the modified state description and evolving 
it with the laws. An important difference between Maudlin’s recipe for ‘constructing’ nearby worlds and my own is 
that I’m using the laws to evolve states in both temporal directions, while Maudlin only uses them to generate what 
is in the future of the state in question. I will explain why I favor the time-symmetric recipe later in this section.   
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I do not aspire to provide a novel solution to this problem here. It is enough for my purposes 
that my account fits well with existing proposals. For concreteness, I shall adopt a view defended 
primarily by David Albert and Barry Loewer, according to which the fundamental laws of physics 
include not only the dynamical laws, but also a law about the initial conditions of the universe. This 
additional law, known as the ‘Past Hypothesis’, specifies that the world began in a low-entropy state s0 
(as a matter of nomological necessity);16 this will guarantee that anti-entropic worlds are extremely rare 
in our modal neighborhoods.   
Adopting the Past Hypothesis as a fundamental law is not our only option. Another option is 
to invoke a time-asymmetric notion of world-similarity in constructing the modal neighborhood. Note 
that my procedure for constructing the modal neighborhood of a region-world pair R,w was time-
symmetric. I considered taking time-slices intersecting the region R, modifying them, and then 
evolving the resulting states with the laws, both towards the future and towards the past. But I could 
have opted instead for a time-asymmetric, non-backtracking distance metric. I could have said, for 
example, that a world is near ours relative to R if and only if it is slightly different at some time t in R, 
identical before t, and respects the laws of our world as much as possible. A region R’s modal 
neighborhood would be constructed by taking some time slice t intersecting R, modifying it slightly, 
and evolving forwards with the dynamical laws, while leaving everything in its past fixed.17 If we 
adopted this time-asymmetric recipe, the reversibility worries that afflict attempts to reduce 
thermodynamics to physics would not arise: almost all worlds in the neighborhood would have normal 
entropy gradients.18 
Readers who are skeptical of the past hypothesis (conceived as a  law) may prefer this 
alternative construction of the modal neighborhood. I chose not to rely on a time-asymmetric notion 
of world nearness/similarity because I did not want to assume that temporal asymmetries could be 
fully explained independently of robustness structure. It seems to me that relying on a time-asymmetric 
similarity metric in the account of higher-level laws amounts to putting an asymmetry into non-
fundamental sciences by hand. But we might have hoped for something more: to see how the whole 
 
16 David Z. Albert, Time and Chance (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); Barry Loewer, "Two accounts of 
laws and time," Philosophical Studies, CLX, 1 (August 2012): 115–37.  
17 Michael Strevens, Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), at p. 290, 
gestures at the view that higher-level laws (robust regularities) are merely regularities that extend to nearby worlds, 
where ‘nearby’ is understood under the non-backtracking interpretation. While he ends up rejecting this sort of view 
(on the grounds that regularities don’t explain their instances), I expect that he would be sympathetic to the idea that 
robust regularities hold throughout modal neighborhoods (given the non-backtracking construction). 
18 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this alternative.   
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structure of non-fundamental science (including temporal asymmetries in non-fundamental laws) 
arises from physics.  
There is, however, an interesting alternative approach which is not objectionably time-
asymmetric. We would start by defining not one notion of crystallization but two: future-crystallization 
and past-crystallization. A regularity is future-crystallized if and only if it features in a good summary 
of the physically possible worlds that are similar in the past, and diverge in the future. A regularity is 
past-crystallized if and only if it features in a good summary of the physically possible worlds that are 
similar in the future, and diverge in the past. We could then try to explain why future-crystallized 
regularities are more significant to embedded agents like us than past-crystallized generalizations (why 
they are more capable of playing the robustness role). The challenge would be to have an explanation 
for this that didn’t itself smuggle other higher-level temporal asymmetries (for example, the fact that 
we can influence the past but not the future). Pursing this alternative strategy requires a more rigorous 
exploration of the foundations of statistical mechanics and its relation to the asymmetry of agency, 
which I will have to postpone for future work.  
 
 
II.2 Balancing Theoretical Virtues. In its original formulation, the best systems account was meant to be 
an account of fundamental laws.19 It has since been used to motivate an egalitarian picture where 
special sciences can have their own ‘best systems’, expressed in their own vocabularies.20 However, the 
foundationalist tradition has not drawn on the insights from Lewis’s account of laws to shed light on 
how statements about the macro-world inherit their elite nomic status from the underlying physics. 
This is what I propose to do in what follows. I will repurpose what I take to be the most promising 
aspects of Lewis’s best systems view to give a foundationalist account of robust regularities at all levels 
of description.  
Systems will be assessed along three dimensions: i) how faithfully they describe the modal 
neighborhood (accuracy), ii) how much they tell us about the modal neighborhood (informativeness), and  
iii) how easily they can be expressed in suitable vocabularies (simplicity). The best system is the set of 
statements that strikes the best balance of these virtues.  
 
 
19 David Lewis, Counterfactuals, op. cit. 
20 Callender & Cohen, "Special Sciences, Conspiracy and the Better Best System Account of Lawhood," op. cit.  
Cohen & Callender, "A Better Best System Account of Lawhood," op. cit.  
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Simplicity. A system is simple to the extent that it has a short formulation. Since the length of a statement 
is language-dependent, we need a privileged language. What could be a principled choice? Lewis 
suggests that all candidate systems be stated in a ‘fundamental language’, that is, a language whose 
predicates denote fundamental properties.21 But this will not do in the present context, where the goal 
is to allow for systems that describe reality at many levels of description (that is, in the vocabulary of 
many special sciences).  
Instead, I will draw on an idea due to Micahel Hicks and Jonathan Schaffer22. They modify 
Lewis’s criterion to allow non-fundamental quantities (such as acceleration) into the lawbook. Their 
idea is to let candidate systems be written in any language whatsoever, and take a system’s simplicity 
to be a function of i) its length, and ii) the degrees of naturalness of its primitive predicates. On this 
approach, ‘Gremeralds are grue’ will be complex despite superficially appearing simple, because its 
predicates denote highly unnatural properties. (A property’s degree of naturalness could be taken as 
primitive, it could be understood in terms of ease of definability in fundamental terms23, or it could be 
taken to depend on our interests and/or psychological makeup).24 25 
 
Informativeness. Start from a familiar idea: a system is informative when it rules out many possibilities; 
it is uninformative when it rules out few possibilities. Although this cannot be understood 
straightforwardly in terms of the number of possibilities, there is something in this idea that is worth 
keeping.  
Imagine you and I are trying to locate a spider in a large empty room. You have been told that 
the spider is in a particular corner; I have only been told which half of the room the spider is in. Clearly, 
you are more informed than me. But how much more? A natural answer suggests itself: it depends on 
 
21 David Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, LXI, 4 (December 1983): 
343–77. 
22 Michael Townsen Hicks and Jonathan Schaffer, “Derivative Properties in Fundamental Laws”, The British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science, LXVIII, 2 (September 2015): 411–50.  
23 David Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, LXI, 4 (December 1983): 
343–77. 
24 See Barry Loewer, "Laws and Natural Properties," Philosophical Topics, XXXV, 1/2 (Spring/Fall 2007): 313–28; 
Callender & Cohen, "Special Sciences, Conspiracy and the Better Best System Account of Lawhood," op. cit;  Cohen 
& Callender, "A Better Best System Account of Lawhood," op. cit.  
25 I argue elsewhere ("Naturalness by Law", manuscript) for a version of the second option. I suggest that we define 
the simplicity of a candidate system as a function of 1) syntactic simplicity in a higher-level language, and 2) ‘semantic 
simplicity’, which tracks the complexity of the real definitions of the terms involved. However, the crystallization 
account is compatible with any conception of degrees of naturalness, including ones in which naturalness is 
anthropocentric and/or context-dependent. 
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how much bigger my region of possible locations is than yours. Although both of our information-
states are compatible with continuum many possible spider-locations, there is a sense in which you’ve 
ruled out more possibilities than I have. This is because, using a natural measure on the space of 
possible locations, we can say that the region of possibilities associated with my information-state is 
larger than the region of possibilities associated with yours. 
 We can generalize this idea by imposing a measure on sets of worlds: the informativeness of 
a system S relative to a region R is inversely proportional to the measure of the set of all worlds v such 
that S holds at <R, v>.26  
Does the dependence on a choice of measure suggest that informativeness is not an objective 
property of systems? Not if some measures are privileged from the perspective of physics. For 
instance, Classical Statistical Mechanics has an impressive track record of explanations that rely on a 
standard measure on phase space. Although we can define various measures on this space, there is one 
measure that respects the intrinsic structure of the space (giving a natural notion of ‘volume’), and 
uniquely satisfies a natural dynamical constraint: a region of measure m always evolves, under 
Hamiltonian dynamics, into another region of measure m. This natural measure on phase space induces 
a natural measure on the space of physically possible worlds, which can then be plugged in to the 
above definition of informativeness.   
Admittedly, more needs to be said to support the connection between a measure’s naturalness 
and its appropriateness for defining theoretical virtues (such as informativeness). My conjecture is that, 
in worlds like ours, ‘how many’ possibilities an agent can rule out (by the lights of the natural measure) 
will  correlate better with agents’ abilities to achieve their goals – and, therefore, natural measures track 
quantities that we care about. A rigorous argument for this conjecture would require a much deeper 
understanding of agency (and its physical basis), and falls outside the scope of this paper. 
 
Accuracy. Accuracy is not standardly considered a virtue to be balanced with simplicity and 
informativeness, except in the case of probabilistic generalizations, where a closely related notion (‘fit’) 
is introduced. For Lewis, a set of statements will not even enter the best systems competition if it 
 
26 We may need to refine this definition to favor systems whose information can be easily ‘extracted’. Predicting what 
will happen to an ecosystem on the basis of the physical laws alone would be extremely hard, because ecosystems are 
highly complex when described in physical vocabulary. This same situation may be relatively easy to model at a higher 
level, if there are dynamical generalizations about ecosystems specifiable in macro-terms. These generalizations could 
be used to (tractably) derive predictions about the system without specifying its initial state in full detail. (Making this 
precise will have to be postponed for future work). 
 15 
contains a single falsehood. This, however, seems unmotivated when we’re dealing with special science 
generalizations. It seems odd to require generalizations to be exactly true to feature in the best system, 
when it is difficult to come up with a single example of a strictly true generalization that is considered 
elite in the special sciences. I suggest, instead, that we drop this requirement. We can take accuracy to 
be a third virtue, which can sometimes be sacrificed to some degree in favor of the other two virtues.  
The best systems competition, as I envisage it, looks for systems that can function as 
summaries of any world-region pair in a modal neighborhood. This departure from standard best 
systems accounts will require a non-standard notion of accuracy: accuracy relative to a modal 
neighborhood. I will take the accuracy of a system, relative to a modal neighborhood, to be given by 
its average accuracy throughout that neighborhood. (If we’re dealing with indeterministic physical laws 
that assign probabilities to world-histories, we should weigh accuracy-scores throughout the modal 
neighborhood accordingly, so that exceptions in improbable worlds are less costly). 
I have not yet said how we will quantify a system’s accuracy with respect to each world-region 
pair. We will need a degreed notion of accuracy, which counts some falsehoods as being more accurate 
than others. For instance, ‘All ravens are black’ (although false) should count as more accurate than 
‘All ravens are white’.  
A simple-minded metric may work for generalizations like ‘All ravens are black’. We can just 
ask how numerous and widespread the exceptions are (that is, how many non-black ravens are there?). 
However, we need something subtler to deal with generalizations that depart from this simple form, 
such as generalizations connecting variables that take continuously many values. Take the ideal gas 
law, which mathematically relates various macro-variables of gases (pressure, volume, and temperature, 
number of molecules). No real gas satisfies this generalization exactly, but almost all gases will 
approximately satisfy it. To measure the generalization’s accuracy, we take each of the instances in the 
relevant region (that is, each gas located within the region), measure the divergence between its macro-
properties at various times (its pressure, volume, and temperature) and those of the most similar ideal 
gas, and then aggregate those divergences (across various macro-properties for each gas, and then 
across all gases in the region).  
  
II.3 Probabilistic Axioms. I have been restricting my attention to non-probabilistic generalizations. It is 
a nice feature of my account that it can be straightforwardly extended to deal with probabilistic 
generalizations, regardless of whether the underlying physical laws are themselves deterministic or 
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stochastic. The strategy for this extension comes from Lewis27; I will merely explain how to adapt it to 
our context.  
Consider a simple world that consists of a random sequence of coin tosses: HTTH 
HHTHTTHTHH… If someone asked you to tell them something concise and informative about this 
world, what would you say? By listing the whole sequence, you could be maximally informative, but 
you would not be concise. You could say something less specific, like ‘about half the tosses came up 
Heads’. But you could be even more helpful by giving your interlocutor the following set of 
instructions: for any sufficiently long sub-sequence, expect about half Heads and half Tails; for each 
particular outcome, be indifferent between Heads and Tails; expect many consecutive Tails (or Heads) 
to occur quite rarely… These instructions may not sound concise as they stand, but they can be 
packaged into a single ‘chance axiom’: an assignment of a number between 0 and 1 to the relevant pair 
of properties. In this case: <coming up Heads, being a coin toss> is assigned the number 1/2. 
Unlike statements, chance axioms do not inform by telling us which propositions to put in our 
‘belief-boxes’. Instead, they directly tell us how to adjust our credences in various propositions. In our 
simple coin-world, the statement Pr (Heads, coin toss) = 1/2 tells us that, absent specific information 
about the outcome, we should be indifferent between Heads and Tails.28 It also tells us that we should 
expect roughly equal numbers of Heads and Tails in the long run, and so on.  
Chance axioms, so understood, are not simply true or false, and they do not rule out any 
possibilities.29 Thus, the notions of informativeness and accuracy characterized above will not apply. 
However, these axioms can be judged for informativeness and accuracy on the basis of the credences 
that they recommend. There are standard ways of quantifying how ‘opinionated’ a distribution is, 
which we could use to quantify systems’ informativeness (assuming we’re dealing with systems that 
specify complete probability distributions over world-region pairs).30 Moreover, standard notions of 
 
27 See David Lewis, "Humean Supervenience Debugged," Mind, CIII, 412 (October 1994): 473–90. 
28 I’m assuming there is some principle along the lines of Lewis’s Principal Principle connecting chance axioms and 
credences. 
29 I’m not suggesting that natural language statements about objective probabilities fail to express propositions. They 
are naturally interpreted as saying something like ‘the best system recommends such-and-such credences’. 
30 The technical notion is ‘entropy’. (Not to be confused with thermodynamic entropy, which is a property of physical 
systems). Roughly, the entropy of a probability function Pr specifies the amount of information you expect to get from 
a subsequent observation – under the idealization that you will observe event E with probability Pr(E). A uniform 
distribution has maximum entropy, and a distribution that assigns probability one to a single outcome (in our case, a 
single world-region pair) has zero entropy.  
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‘distance from the truth’ (relative to each world in the modal neighborhood) yield a natural combined 
estimate of accuracy and informativeness.31  
Not all candidate systems explicitly specify complete probability distributions. A candidate 
system may consist of a single probabilistic axiom: ∀x Pr (black(x)|raven(x))= 0.99. We can think of 
such an axiom as stating a constraint on probability distributions. Pr satisfies this constraint if and only 
if for every pair of propositions p and q, if p says of some object that it is black and q says of that same 
object that it is a raven then Pr ( p| q)=0.99. To evaluate the accuracy and informativeness of a system 
like this one, we can use a simple trick: associate the system with the  least informative distribution 
that satisfies the constraints imposed by the system. In a sense, this distribution incorporates only the 
information embodied by the system, so we can let the system inherit its accuracy/informativeness 
score(s) from the associated distribution.  
 
The crystallization account is now complete: the crystallized regularities within a region are the axioms 
of the best system for the region’s modal neighborhood. In what follows I will argue that this account 
vindicates the intuitive distinctions that the foundationalist wanted to draw, and also promises to 
illuminate the importance of robust regularities for beings like us. But before doing this, I would like 
to draw attention to two ‘free parameters’ within the account, and say something about how I 
understand them.  
How nearby does <R,v> have to be in order to be in the modal neighborhood of <R,w>? I 
will leave this proximity threshold unspecified.  The crystallization account succeeds as long as there is 
some (non-extreme) setting of this threshold that characterizes the notion of robustness that we care 
about.  
The best systems account also requires a balancing function specifying how much each of the 
virtues matters to the system’s overall quality. Where we draw the boundary between crystallized and 
 
31 For distributions defined on a finite set of propositions, a natural choice is the Brier score: the average squared 
distance between the subject’s credence in atomic proposition P and the ‘true value’ of P (that is, 0 if P is false, and 
1 if it is true). The ‘distance from the truth’ idea can be generalized to the continuous case, provided that the 
hypothesis-space has metric structure. See for instance the ‘continuous ranked probability score’ (CRPS), in Thomas 
A. Brown, "Admissible Scoring Systems for Continuous Distributions," RAND Corporation (August 1974). The Brier 
score and the CRPS in fact capture at the same time the uncertainty of the distribution, as well as its ‘reliability’ (See 
Hans Hersbach, "Decomposition of the Continuous Ranked Probability Score for Ensemble Prediction 
Systems," Weather and Forecasting, XV, 5 (October 2000): 559–70.) Thus, if accuracy is measured in accordance to one 
of these rules, we only need to consider two virtues: accuracy score and simplicity.  
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non-crystallized regularities depends on the choice of balancing function. For some choices, perhaps, 
only generalizations stated in physical vocabulary (for example, Schrodinger’s equation) come out as 
crystallized. But the more we weight we put on informativeness, the more generalizations will count 
as crystallized. This is the key to understanding why crystallized regularities are not just the equations 
that describe with perfect accuracy the dynamics of fundamental particles (or fields). We can get more 
informative systems about the modal neighborhood(s) we inhabit if we begin to tolerate some 
inaccuracy, as well as greater complexity. The most powerful summaries of our modal neighborhood(s) 
will include, besides physical generalizations, stable generalizations written in the vocabulary of 
biology, neuroscience, geology, and so on. 
Thinking of the balancing function and the proximity threshold as free parameters allows us 
to draw fine distinctions between the statuses of different sciences and different generalizations within 
a science. We can make sense of the idea that some generalizations are ‘more’ crystallized than others, 
if they feature in the best system under strictly more parameter-values. For instance, chemical and 
thermodynamic generalizations could turn out to be more crystallized than generalizations in biology 
and economics. This fits nicely with a conception of robustness defended by Sandra Mitchell32, on 
which the nomic statuses of regularities vary along multiple dimensions such as: stability, tractability, 
strength, idealization, and so on. 
We can ask how various kinds of human theorizing relate to the above parameters. I will not 
settle this issue here, but I expect that, for any given context, there is a range of parameter-values that 
characterize the distinctions we care about equally well. This is as it should be with reductions of 
human concepts: the candidate metaphysical analyses should be precise, and the mapping from our 
vague terms to those candidate analyses should be indeterminate. 
 
III. Robustness as Crystallization 
 
According to the ‘crystallization account’, the notion of crystallization defined in §2 accounts for the 
notion of robustness characterized in §1.1 by its theoretical role. The goal of this section is to show 
why this claim should appeal to foundationalists.   
 
32 This fits nicely with a conception of robustness defended by Sandra D. Mitchell, "Dimensions of Scientific Law," 
Philosophy of Science, LXVII, 2 (June 2000): 242–65, on which the nomic statuses of regularities vary along multiple 
dimensions such as: stability, tractability, strength, idealization, and so on. 
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The claim that crystallization accounts for robustness can be understood in two ways. On one 
reading, the thesis says that the definition of crystallization stated before is itself a definition of 
robustness in more fundamental terms. On a weaker reading, the thesis states that, in worlds like ours, 
every robustness fact holds in virtue of a corresponding crystallization fact. This weaker thesis allows 
robustness facts that are grounded in some other way in distant worlds. The choice between these two 
theses will depend on subtle metaphysical and meta-semantic issues that I would like to bracket here; 
thus, I will only be arguing for their disjunction. 
In what follows I will argue, first, that the account explains the intuitive contrast between ‘local 
necessities’ (such as ‘All ravens are black’) and mere accidents (such as ‘All the pennies in my pocket 
are silver’), and in doing so vindicates the core intuitions motivating foundationalism (§3.1). Then I 
will show that adopting the crystallization account allows us to draw a further nomic distinction that 
is crucial for a theory of explanation (§3.2). Finally, I will suggest that thinking of robustness in terms 
of crystallization takes us a step towards a more ambitious foundationalist goal: understanding – from 
the perspective of physics – the importance that robust regularities have for physical agents like us. 
§3.3 sketches the beginnings of such a story.   
 
III.1 Local Necessities. I started out drawing a contrast between ‘All the pennies in my pocket are silver’ 
and ‘All ravens are black’. While the former seems accidental, the latter does not. The challenge was 
to identify the physical basis for this modal difference, given that both regularities depend on physically 
contingent factors. The crystallization account has the resources to explain this contrast.  
Let me start by introducing the notion of a ‘local necessity’: 
 
LOCAL NECESSITY 
To be ‘locally necessary’ (relative to R,w) is to be metaphysically necessitated by the 
robust regularities at <R,w>. 
 
If we accept that crystallization accounts for robustness, we can conclude that a regularity is ‘locally 
necessary’ (relative to R,w) if and only if it is metaphysically necessitated by the axioms of the best 
system of the modal neighborhood for <R,w>. A regularity is accidental if it not locally necessary.  
I cannot offer decisive proof that generalizations like ‘All ravens are black’ will be necessitated 
by the axioms of the best system. Similarly, proponents of the best systems account of fundamental 
laws cannot prove that Schrodinger’s equation (or whatever equation will come to replace it) will feature 
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in the best system. All I will offer is a plausibility argument that statements like these are either in the 
best system, or entailed by it.  
As far as we know, ‘All ravens are black’ is highly accurate in our world, at least if we restrict 
ourselves to a certain epoch on Earth – say, the 21st Century. It is plausible, moreover, that this 
regularity holds in the corresponding modal neighborhood. Choose any time in this century, and find 
physically possible worlds that are very similar to ours at that time. Surely you will not see pink ravens 
populating Earth in this world a decade later or a decade before.  
Besides being accurate throughout nearby worlds, ‘All ravens are black’ appears to be 
informative, simple, and mentions no gerrymandered properties. Given this, it is plausibly an axiom 
of the best system, unless it already follows from other axioms. In either case, it will count as a ‘local 
necessity’ and therefore as non-accidental. The same can be said for many other biological 
generalizations, which may be contingent but have a genetic basis that is widespread and resistant to 
small physical changes. For example: ‘Tigers have stripes’, ‘Olives are high in sodium’, or ‘Humans are 
subject to confirmation bias’.  
This plausibility argument extends beyond generalizations with a genetic basis. Some 
crystallized regularities may be sustained by powerful and widespread cultural mechanisms: for 
example, English speakers say ‘hello’ when they encounter a friend… The  psychological features 
underlying these dispositions are spread across many minds, and sustained by a complex dynamic of 
social incentives. This makes it plausible that small physical changes will not disrupt them. If so, these 
generalizations are highly accurate throughout the kinds of modal neighborhoods we care about. Since 
they are also plausibly simple and informative, we can expect them to be axioms of the best system (if 
not already entailed by other axioms).33 
You may wonder whether the account’s yielding the robustness of such mundane 
generalizations as ‘English speakers say ‘hello’…’ is not a symptom of excessive permissiveness. I think 
not: many true generalizations will be too modally fragile from the perspective of physics to make it 
to the best system of the modal neighborhood for a region of interest.  
To see how the account rules out accidental generalizations, let us consider a couple of cases. 
Start with our simple example: ‘All the coins in my pocket are silver’. This generalization will be highly 
inaccurate throughout any sufficiently expansive modal neighborhood. It fails in all the worlds where 
 
33 As this example illustrates, crystallized regularities can depend on arbitrary conventions. Such regularities may have 
been fragile when the convention was just starting, but they are now crystallized.    
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I find a lucky penny on my way to work, or where I get five pennies instead of a nickel at the local 
café.  
Now take a more interesting case, which has been used to illustrate the difference between 
foundationalism and egalitarianism.34 Imagine that, in some spatio-temporal region of our world, coins 
happen to land Heads 90% of the time, despite the physical characteristics of coins and coin-tossers 
being just as they are around here. The foundationalist regards these patterns as flukes, not 
autonomous robust regularities. After all, they do not seem like the kinds of regularities that our 
physical laws are capable of reliably sustaining.   
The crystallization account can accommodate this foundationalist intuition. Take an arbitrary 
time-slice intersecting the spatio-temporal region R where coins landed heads 90% of the time. As 
before, make small changes to the state of R at the relevant time: change the trajectory of a bird, the 
position of a few specks of dust, or the speed of a few air molecules. Many such changes will make a 
difference to the exact velocity and height with which coins are tossed after t. Given the symmetry of 
the coin (and the underlying physics) the frequency of heads in almost all of these worlds will end up 
being much lower than 0.9. If so, the generalization ‘Coins land heads with probability 0.9’ will be 
highly inaccurate in nearby worlds, and any system is plausibly better off without it. 
The moral is that we can allow for contingent regularities to figure in the best system for non-
fundamental phenomena, without having to give up foundationalism altogether. The crystallization 
account shows that robust regularities can be dependent on, and sufficiently constrained by, the 
fundamental physical structure, even if they are not determined by the physical laws alone. This, I 
think, is the first step to vindicating the foundationalist worldview.  
 
III.2 Axioms and Theorems. As we saw already, differences in modal force are not the only differences 
that we deem scientifically relevant. ‘All ravens are black-or-green’ does not share the explanatory 
status of ‘All ravens are black’, but neither is accidental. The present account has the resources to draw 
these fine-grained distinctions. Crystallized regularities are the axioms of the best system. They are to 
be distinguished from mere local necessities (the statements they necessitate). Unlike the axioms, mere 
local necessities do not have a distinguished explanatory status.   
Let me now illustrate the work that the axioms/local necessities distinction can do for us, by 
discussing a few cases mentioned before. Suppose ‘All ravens are black’ is crystallized relative to earth-
 
34 This example was suggested to me by David Albert.  
 22 
2019. Then ‘All ravens are black or green’ will be deductively entailed by the best system for this region, 
and will thereby count as a ‘local necessity’ relative to earth-2019. Note, however, that the simpler 
generalization ‘All ravens are black’ will exclude ‘All ravens are black or green’ from the axioms of the 
best system. Adding the disjunctive statement as an axiom would yield a more complex system, with 
no gain in accuracy or informativeness. Thus, the system that didn’t explicitly include the disjunctive 
statement was better.   
Now consider ‘All gremeralds are grue’. By my account of simplicity, generalizations that have 
short formulations in highly natural vocabulary are simpler than generalizations that only have 
comparably short generalizations in unnatural vocabulary. Keeping this assumption in mind, compare 
the pair of gruesome generalizations (‘Gremeralds are grue’, ‘Graphires are bleen’) with the pair 
(‘Emeralds are green’, ‘Sapphires are blue’). Given the connection between simplicity and naturalness, 
the latter pair is simpler. And given that the pairs are equally informative and accurate, it’ll be the latter 
that gets into the best system’s axioms – if either does. 
Finally, recall the variant of Kyburg’s example: the generalization ‘Hexed caffeinated beverages 
keep humans awake’ (where x is ‘hexed’ iff certain ‘hexing’ gestures and utterances were made over it). 
I can explain why the coffee I hexed this morning kept me up, by saying that caffeine keeps humans 
awake, and that hexed coffee was caffeinated. My explanation would be worse had I cited instead the 
generalization ‘Hexed caffeinated beverages keep humans awake’. The distinction between axioms and 
theorems helps explain this asymmetry: ‘Hexed caffeinated beverages keep humans awake’  follows 
from the simpler and more informative claim, namely: ‘Caffeine keeps humans awake’. Given this, the 
hexed caffeine generalization is excluded from the axioms of the best system.   
Perhaps ‘Caffeine keeps humans awake’ is entailed by other generalizations which are 
themselves axioms – in which case it will not be an axiom either. Even so, the distinction between 
axioms and local necessities may help us account for the fact that ‘Hexed caffeinated beverages keep 
humans awake’ doesn’t explain its instances, while ‘Caffeine keeps humans awake’ does. Here is a 
sketch of how this could go. Suppose that a locally necessary generalization explains one of its instances 
if and only if the generalization figures in every ‘suitable’ argument from the axioms to that instance 
(where ‘suitability’ requires an optimal balance of simplicity/naturalness, generalizability, and other 
such features). An account along these lines may give us the resources to distinguish between local 
necessities that can be cited to explain their instances (such as ‘Caffeine keeps humans awake’) and 
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those that are too specific (such as ‘Hexed caffeinated beverages keep humans awake’), or too 
disjunctive (such as ‘Caffeine-or-sugar keeps humans awake’) to explain their instances.35  
 
III.3 Why Care about Robustness? The foundationalist vision will be vindicated if all nomic facts can be 
understood in terms of physics. But we could hope for more: we could hope to understand, from the 
perspective of physics, why higher-level nomic facts are of interest to intelligent beings. Why should 
physical agents care about the distinction between robust and accidental regularities? In this section I 
will outline a strategy for answering this question that draws on the crystallization account. 
Essential to our survival is the ability to select the best action available to us, given the state of 
our environment. Knowledge about the actual world does not suffice for these purposes if we cannot 
draw on it to infer what would happen if we were to act in one way or another. Even if we could predict 
the choices we will actually make, this would not tell us what we need to know: which of the available 
choices would be best for us, given our goals. Knowledge of robust regularities is crucial to us because 
we can rely upon it when reasoning hypothetically about possible ways to intervene on our 
environment. As I will now explain, this knowledge enables us to trace connections between merely 
possible actions, and the states of affairs that would result from these actions.  
When reasoning hypothetically, we distinguish between certain facts that are settled 
independently of us (e.g, the laws of physics), and facts that are contingent on our decisions. This 
determines our ‘agential possibilities’. Roughly, a state of affairs P is agentially possible from an agent’s 
perspective at a time t if, for some possible decision D which is available to her at t, she treats D → P 
(or probably P) as fixed. 
Which regularities should an agent hold fixed by default in hypothetical reasoning? One might 
have thought it is only physical necessities (that is, entailments of the physical laws). On this picture, 
what is possible for an agent is given by what the agent’s decisions (together with the agent’s specific 
knowledge about the present) can physically necessitate.36 For example, the light's turning on is 
 
35 This is merely a promissory note. There have been more rigorous attempts to characterize what makes a derivation 
‘suitable’. See, for instance, Philip Kitcher, "Explanatory Unification," Philosophy of Science, XLVIII, 4 (December 1981): 
507–31. A parallel issue has been discussed in the literature on mathematical explanation: what makes a mathematical 
proof explanatory? See Mark Steiner, "Mathematical Explanation," Philosophical Studies, XXXIV, 2 (August 1978): 135–
51; and Marc Lange, "Explanatory Proofs and Beautiful Proofs," Journal of Humanistic Mathematics, VI, 1 (January 2016): 
8–51. 
36 Since what an agent knows about the present includes memories/records, we expect such an agent ends up holding 
fixed lots of past events as well.  
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agentially possible for you because, holding fixed what you know about the present, your decision to 
flip a switch physically necessitates the light’s turning on. 
The crystallization account suggests an interesting alternative: treating physically contingent 
regularities as fixed may be advantageous, if these regularities are crystallized with respect to an agent’s 
modal neighborhood. This idea can be motivated with a few thought-experiments.  
Suppose that ‘Caffeine keeps humans awake’ holds in almost all worlds in the modal 
neighborhood of Earth-today. Consider two worlds in this modal neighborhood. In the first world, 
you are sleepy but desire to stay awake at t. The second world is almost exactly alike at t, except for 
your wanting to fall sleep. Now consider what happens if you hold fixed the caffeine regularity in 
hypothetical reasoning. In both situations you will conclude that you would stay awake if you were to 
consume caffeine, and you would fall asleep otherwise. As a result, you will choose to consume caffeine 
in the first situation, and not in the second. Since the caffeine regularity likely holds in any arbitrarily 
chosen worlds in the modal neighborhood, it is plausible that the following is true of the modal 
neighborhood: ‘If I hold fixed the caffeine regularity, then my goals to stay awake/sleep will correlate 
with my staying awake/sleeping’.  
Now consider an agent that is otherwise similar to you, but that only holds fixed physically 
necessary regularities, together with whatever she knows about the present state of the world. Could 
such an agent exploit the caffeine-awake connection on the basis of physical necessities? It depends 
on what kind of agent we have in mind. Suppose that, at the time of her decision (t), the agent knows 
all the true statements of the form ‘It is nomologically necessary that if condition X obtains at t, 
consuming caffeine shortly after t will keep me awake’. Let C be the class of all conditions that satisfy 
the above statement. If the agent knows enough about the present condition of her environment to 
determine whether a member of C obtains in her current situation, then she will be in a position to 
infer that caffeine would keep her awake. Assuming our agent is logically omniscient, this will lead her 
to drink caffeine whenever she wants to stay awake. But we – and all other physical agents – are 
importantly different from this agent. Firstly, it may be difficult for us to find out whether the enabling 
conditions C obtain in a given circumstance. Secondly, it might be difficult for us to draw the required 
inferences (if the set of enabling conditions is complex enough).  In light of this, we’re probably better 
off holding fixed ‘Caffeine keeps people awake’. 
These observations may be taken to suggest that the more true generalizations we hold fixed 
in hypothetical reasoning, the better off we are – in which case there is nothing special about 
crystallized regularities. But this is not right. Consider what happens to an agent who holds fixed 
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regularities that are too modally fragile. Imagine I get sleepy at 10pm every day, and conclude this 
regularity is robust. The night before an important deadline I would like to stay awake past 10pm, but 
I hold fixed the regularity that I take to be robust. This leads me to conclude that, regardless of what 
I do (e.g. how much caffeine I consume), I will be sleepy by 10pm. If I do this repeatedly throughout 
my life, ‘I get sleepy at 10pm’ may in fact turn out to be true – but only because, in mistaking it for a 
robust regularity, I missed the opportunity to break it. There is a clear sense in which my deliberation 
is sub-optimal here: another physically possible agent which is otherwise similar, but doesn’t treat ‘I 
will be sleepy by 10 pm’ as fixed, will likely do better than me in achieving the same goals. 
These thought-experiments motivate the following hypothesis: physical agents who hold fixed 
crystallized regularities in reasoning are (on average) better adapted to their modal neighborhoods than 
agents that hold fixed fewer or more regularities; that is, they tend to fulfill their goals in more nearby 
possible worlds. Why should an agent care about the extent to which a strategy succeeds in nearby 
worlds? Because, plausibly, the extent to which it succeeds in nearby worlds typically coincides with 
the extent to which it succeeds in the actual world. A strategy is unlikely to systematically fulfill one’s 
goals in one’s home world without doing so throughout one’s modal neighborhood.37 
It is thus possible that agents in general need to accomplish the following feat: develop 
cognitive procedures that incrementally uncover the most efficient summaries of the modal 
neighborhoods that they inhabit. If so, then to better understand the connections between robustness 
and other central aspects of our theorizing (explanation, prediction, hypothetical/counterfactual 
reasoning, controlled interventions…), we should be trying to understand how each of these cognitive 
activities fits within an overall strategy for solving the above problem, given the constraints that 
physical systems are subject to.  
 
I have offered foundationalists three reasons to think that robustness coincides with crystallization. 
Firstly, this view identifies a physical basis for the accidental/non-accidental distinction that we find 
in the special sciences, where many regularities are treated as having a kind of natural necessity, despite 
their physical contingency (§3.1). Secondly, the crystallization account vindicates distinctions in 
 
37 One might think that the crystallization account needs a claim of this sort anyway: if actual frequencies didn’t 
typically align with frequencies throughout the modal neighborhood, it is hard to see how we could get evidence for 
crystallization statements on the basis of actual frequencies. By ‘typical’ I have in mind something like high physical 
probability: P is typical if and only if it is probable according to any probability distribution that is reasonable by the 
lights of physics. 
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explanatory status between regularities that are alike in their modal strength, by giving simplicity in 
higher-level vocabularies a central role (§3.2). Thirdly, the account promises to shed light on the 
question: why do we bother categorizing some regularities as ‘robust’? One reason is that these 
regularities form a system that we can rely upon to carry out tractable inferences in deliberative 
contexts (§3.3).  
 
IV. COMPARISONS 
 
In the rest of the paper, I will discuss how the crystallization account relates to two approaches to 
robustness that appear in the literature. The first is a contemporary version of the reductionist 
tradition, which goes back to Putnam and Oppenheim (1948); the second takes robustness to be a 
form of counterfactual stability. I will argue that both are compatible with, and usefully supplemented 
by, the notion of crystallization. 
 
IV.1 The Mentaculus. As I explained in §2, my preferred version of the crystallization account assumes 
that the physical lawbook includes, alongside the dynamical laws, a law stating that the universe began 
in a very low entropy state (the ‘Past Hypothesis’). Without it, I said, the modal neighborhood would 
be plagued by anti-entropic worlds, and many familiar time-asymmetric generalizations would not turn 
out to be crystallized.  
Albert and Loewer have argued that the Past Hypothesis, together with a uniform probability 
distribution over all initial micro-conditions that realize it, gives us the foundation for all of science.38 
Those who are sympathetic to their view may wonder why, having taken the Past Hypothesis on board, 
I need the notion of crystallization at all. I will argue, however, that Albert and Loewer should welcome 
the notion of crystallization I’m providing, since it complements their account of the physical basis for 
special science theorizing.   
Let us grant that the Past Hypothesis, together with a probability distribution over initial 
conditions, is in fact sufficient to derive probabilistic versions of all thermodynamic generalizations 
(as Albert has argued).39 Even granting this, we’ll probably still need to appeal to theoretical virtues to 
prevent disjunctive/gruesome and uninformative statements counting as robust. But do we need the 
 
38 See Albert, op. cit. and Loewer, op cit.  
39 Ibid.  
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notion of the modal neighborhood at all? Why not say that the robust regularities are those that feature 
in the best system of all physically possible worlds?  
The importance of the notion of the modal neighborhood can be made vivid with an example. 
Consider some hypothesis about brain lateralization in chimpanzees: ‘the left hemisphere of a 
chimpanzee’s brain is more active than the right hemisphere during task T’. Neuroscience has 
proceeded under the assumption that such regularities can be robust. But presumably, those left/right 
asymmetries would not have their basis in the laws of physics, whether these laws include the Past 
Hypothesis or not. Such asymmetries depend on the chimpanzee’s evolutionary history, which could 
have just as easily gone a different way. Given this, brain lateralization hypotheses could not feature in 
the best system of all physically possible worlds.  
Albert would say that the left-hemisphere statement is highly likely (if true), but only once we 
conditionalize on some historical event which led to the left-hemisphere regularity. I agree, but I 
require an account of the rules for conditionalizing in this way. I can cook up all sorts of propositions 
on which to conditionalize. If the laws are deterministic, then for any event e there will be true 
propositions P about the past such that Pr (e|P) = 1 according to Albert’s lawbook. But this doesn’t 
show that the event was non-accidental, explanatory, inductively learnable… 
What I’m providing is a principled way to meet the above requirement. The interesting 
background conditions (the ones that we tend to implicitly ‘conditionalize on’) are not simply all those 
that figure as antecedents of nomologically necessary statements. They are ‘crystallization conditions’: 
stable background conditions which – together with the laws – sustain the regularities that are 
crystallized within the region in question. 
 
IV.2 Counterfactual Stability Accounts. The idea that robustness is a form of counterfactual stability 
features prominently in the literature, and it was an important source of inspiration for my account.40 
I would like to end by explaining how my account relates to this proposal. 
 
40 Sandra D. Mitchell, "Dimensions of Scientific Law," op. cit., argues that laws are less contingent than mere accidents, 
because they would hold under a wider range of background conditions. James Woodward and Christopher 
Hitchcock, "Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account," Nous, XXXVII, 1 (March 2003): 1–24, 
defend the idea that regularities are robust if and only if they would remain invariant under certain kinds of 
interventions. In a similar vein, Michael Strevens, "The Explanatory Role of Irreducible Properties." Noûs, XLVI, 4 
(December 2010): 754–80), argues that ‘All ravens are black’ has a special nomic status despite its contingency, due 
to the ‘physical inertia’ of the underlying coloration mechanism (which he cashes out in terms of counterfactuals). 
See also: Michael Strevens, "Physically contingent laws and counterfactual support," op. cit. 
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Counterfactual accounts of robustness share the following schematic form:  
 
G is robust only if for all/many/most relevant counterfactual antecedents q, q > G is accurate. 
 
For reasons I have already discussed, satisfying a counterfactual stability condition of this sort cannot 
suffice for robustness: gruesome regularities can be as stable as physical laws, without thereby attaining 
the status of robust regularities. Nonetheless, I think counterfactual stability accounts identify an 
important necessary condition for robustness, which sets them apart from mere accidents. In what 
follows, I explain how my account vindicates this idea.  
Accuracy throughout the modal neighborhood is closely related to a notion of counterfactual 
stability, which I will call ‘physical stability’. To be physically stable relative to R just is to be stable 
under all ‘relevantR’ physical counterfactuals – where a counterfactual is relevantR iff its antecedent 
stipulates a small enough change to the state of the world (at some time in R). More precisely:  
 
A generalization G is physically stable relative to R, w =def  
For any time t in R, and any (total) physical state s that is similar enough to w’s (total) 
physical state at t:  
It is true at w that (s obtains at t > G is true in R).  
 
In the above condition, ‘similar’ should be understood in terms of a distance metric on the fundamental 
state-space (as explained in §2), and the conditional ‘>’ should be understood in a technical sense:  
 
s obtains at t  >  P  =def   
P holds in all the physically possible world(s) whose total physical state at t is s.  
 
 Call these conditionals ‘physical counterfactuals’. The antecedent of a physical counterfactual takes us 
to a class of physically possible worlds: worlds whose state at some time t is as that antecedent 
stipulates. If the consequent holds where that antecedent takes us, the counterfactual is true. 41 (When 
dealing with  indeterministic laws, we could weaken the requirement that all the antecedent worlds to 
 
41 See Maudlin, op cit., for an account of counterfactuals along these lines.  
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be consequent worlds. It may be enough that the set of antecedent-worlds in which the consequent 
doesn’t hold have measure zero, or close to zero). 
Since no relevantR physical counterfactual takes us outside of R’s modal neighborhood, perfect 
accuracy throughout R’s neighborhood suffices for physical stability relative to R. Conversely, all the 
worlds in R’s neighborhood are reached by some relevantR physical counterfactual. This means that 
stability under all relevantR physical counterfactuals suffices for perfect accuracy throughout this 
neighborhood. We can conclude that a regularity is physically stable relative to R if and only if it is 
perfectly accurate throughout R’s neighborhood.  
The connection between physical stability and accuracy is less straightforward once we 
consider generalizations that are less than perfectly accurate. We might expect that high accuracy 
almost everywhere in the modal neighborhood would correspond to a slightly weakened physical 
stability condition, such as: 
 
A generalization G is highly physically stable relative to R, w=def 
For almost every antecedent of the form ‘s is the state at t’, where t is some time in R, 
and s is a total physical state similar enough to w’s physical state at t, then: 
 
           It is true at w that ( s obtains at t  > G is highly accurate in R).42 
 
However, there is no logical entailment from high accuracy in the modal neighborhood to high physical 
stability (or vice versa). This is because there needn’t be an even measure-theoretic correspondence 
between sets of relevantR counterfactual antecedents, and the sets of worlds they reach. A 
generalization G may be physically unstable, despite being highly accurate in almost all worlds in the 
modal neighborhood, if there are small islands of G-offending worlds are reached by sufficiently many 
counterfactual antecedents. Nonetheless, I see no reason to think that our modal neighborhoods will 
contain many such ‘hyper-accessible’ (or ‘hyper-inaccessible’) islands. If so, it is safe to assume that – 
in worlds like ours – only the highly physically stable regularities relative to R are highly accurate 
throughout R’s modal neighborhood. Thus, any generalization that is low in physical stability is likely 
not an axiom (or theorem) of the relevant modal neighborhood’s best summary. This vindicates the 
intuitive evidential connection between physical instability and accidentality. 
 
42 ‘Almost every time’ will be cashed out in terms of a standard measure on temporal intervals.  
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I defined the notion of physical stability in terms of ‘micro-antecedents’ – that is, antecedents 
specifying total micro-conditions for the world at some time. This is one important respect in which 
it differs from stability conditions on robustness proposed in the literature, which take into 
consideration antecedents formulated in the macro-language of the generalization or scientific field of 
interest. For example, Marc Lange, Christopher Hitchcock, and James Woodward have all suggested 
that special sciences treat different classes of antecedents as relevant, depending on the ‘level’ at which 
they carve reality.43 In what follows, I will explain how this kind of ‘macro-stability’ relates to accuracy 
(and physical stability) and I will argue that the crystallization account vindicates the claim that failures 
of macro-stability are indicative of accidentality. 
For concreteness, I will focus on one particular conception of macro-stability, proposed by 
Hitchcock and Woodward.44 They start from the idea that all special science generalizations are 
mathematical expressions that relate non-fundamental ‘variables’. A variable is a syntactic entity that 
represents a determinable property such as temperature or pressure; its values are numerical entities 
that represent the corresponding determinates. Hitchcock and Woodward propose that a 
generalization G is robust only if it is stable under counterfactual antecedents that set the variables in 
G to alternative values. For example, the ideal gas law should be stable under counterfactual 
antecedents that specify alternative distributions of pressures, temperatures, and volumes; economic 
generalizations should be stable under antecedents that change prices, supply, and demand, and so on.  
For this kind of proposal to work, we must restrict our attention to ‘nearby’ values of the 
macro-variables in question. As Hitchcock and Woodward acknowledge, all generalizations break 
under ‘extreme’ settings of the variables in question, and extreme values are likely just those that are 
only realized in physically distant worlds.45 Thus, their notion of stability can be characterized as 
follows:  
   
A generalization G is macro-stable relative to R, w=def  
For every variable X  in G, every macro-object a which instantiates some value of X (in R), 
and (almost) every number ε sufficiently close to 0:  
 
43 See Marc Lange, "The Autonomy of Functional Biology: A Reply to Rosenberg," Biology & Philosophy, XIX, 1 
(January 2004): 93–109; and James Woodward and Christopher Hitchcock, op cit.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid. 
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It is true at w that (a’s X -value is greater/smaller by ε units >  G would be highly accurate).   
 
In order to understand the connections between macro-stability, physical stability and crystallization, 
we need a more general proposal for evaluating counterfactuals than the one outlined before. I will use 
a Lewis/Stalnaker semantics, with some minor variations: roughly, A >C is true relative to R iff C holds 
in almost all the nearestR worlds where A obtains.46 I will make one crucial assumption about the 
nearness relation, namely that all the worlds in the modal neighborhood of R are nearerR than any world 
outside of it. I do not assume, however, that these assumptions will carry over to a semantic account 
of natural language counterfactuals. It is fine for our purposes if ‘>’ does not capture all speaker 
intuitions about counterfactuals, so long as it identifies an important relation between propositions that 
our counterfactual talk tracks (in certain contexts). 
Several proponents of macro-stability would reject the idea that counterfactuals reduce to 
notions like similarity and laws (as I will be supposing).47 Lange and Woodward are happy to take 
counterfactual truths as primitive (that is, not in need of further analysis). But my goal (unlike theirs) is 
to understand robustness from a foundationalist perspective. In this context, primitivism about 
counterfactuals is unattractive.48 Despite these differences between my project and theirs, I think that 
it will be instructive to compare the two ways of understanding stability, bracketing any differences in 
how we’re understanding the counterfactual conditional ‘>’.  
Suppose we know that a generalization G is accurate throughout some modal neighborhood 
(of Earth throughout 2020, say). Can we conclude that it is also macro-stable relative to this region? I 
think we can. Think of how vast the corresponding modal neighborhood will be. Consider making 
small changes to the actual world on January 1st. You will find worlds where the weather on March 2nd 
is different, worlds where my coffee spills on October 30th, worlds where ten more ravens mate on 
Halloween, and worlds where the supply of shoes on Christmas day is 10% higher. Differences amplify 
as time goes by, yielding great variety in the modal neighborhood. Thus, we should expect the modal 
neighborhood to include worlds that differ from ours with respect to every macro-variable. We should 
 
46 Requiring that the consequent hold in all nearby worlds would simplify the account, but the corresponding stability 
conditions would end up being too demanding (especially given that our modal neighborhoods contains lots of tiny 
islands of anti-thermodynamic worlds).    
47 A notable exception is Michael Strevens, who employs a similarity-based non-backtracking reduction of 
counterfactuals. See Strevens,"Physically contingent laws and counterfactual support," op. cit. 
48 This is not, of course, a criticism of authors that take counterfactuals as primitive; these authors are not engaged 
in the same foundationalist project that I am. 
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expect, then, that almost all the relevant macro-antecedents will be true somewhere in the modal 
neighborhood. Since our robust generalization G approximately holds in almost all worlds of the modal 
neighborhood, relevant macro-antecedents will likely take us to worlds where G approximately holds.49  
The above line of reasoning is far from a rigorous proof. However, I think it makes it credible 
that generalizations which are accurate across some region’s modal neighborhood are also macro-stable 
within that region. This in turn means that that if a generalization fails to be macro-stable in some 
region, then it is unlikely to feature in the best system for that region (either as axiom or theorem).50 If 
this is correct, then the crystallization account vindicates, from a foundationalist perspective, the guiding 
idea behind counterfactual stability accounts of robustness: counterfactual fragility is a clear sign of 
accidentality.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The special sciences treat certain higher-level generalizations as nomically elite or ‘robust’. To a first 
approximation, those generalizations do not seem privileged from the perspective of physics:  they are 
physically contingent, and look highly complex when translated into physical vocabulary. Some 
philosophers take this to indicate autonomy from physics: they conclude that higher-level regularities 
do ‘tnot inherit their robustness from the laws of physics. However, the crystallization account 
demonstrates how these marks of autonomy may be reconciled with foundationalism. On this account, 
robust regularities have a privileged status in virtue of efficiently summarizing patterns throughout our 
‘modal neighborhoods’. 
The idea that much of our scientific theorizing aims at summarizing our modal neighborhoods 
provides a new framework for conceptualizing the connections between robustness, counterfactuals, 
explanation, and induction. This paper has only begun to explore these connections, conjecturing that 
 
49 Without a more precise proposal for counting macro-variable antecedents, it will not be possible to verify that this 
last step is licensed. But I hope that the prima facie plausibility of this reasoning suffices to illuminate the connection 
between the notions in question.  
50 Macro-stability does not suffice for accuracy throughout the modal neighborhood. Take a generalization G, which 
is macro-stable relative to R. For each variable X in G, mark the worlds in R’s modal neighborhood that are the 
closest X-variants (for each object a). Given G’s macro-stability, it will be accurate at all the marked worlds. But it 
needn’t be accurate at unmarked worlds. And unless our set of variables happens to be very comprehensive, these 
unmarked worlds will occupy a significant proportion of the modal neighborhood.  
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we rely on these summaries to reason counterfactually/hypothetically about nearby possibilities (for 
example, in deliberation). Future work should evaluate this conjecture more systematically, and also 
explore how modal neighborhoods connect to explanation and prediction. Why is our knowledge of 
the future so deeply intertwined with our knowledge of the modal neighborhood? How do our 
attempts to explain observable patterns in the actual world contribute to the construction of accurate 
summaries for modal neighborhoods of various sizes? Are there explanatory connections between 
summaries for various neighborhoods? If so, how do we discover them? 
 
